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In the early 1990s, political science scholarship on international law coalesced into an 
“International Law/International Relations” (IL/IR) research agenda focused primarily on one 
type of law (public international law) and one type of court (international courts), and on their 
relationship to states. Given the traditional state-centric emphasis of political science’s 
international relations subfield, this focus was unsurprising. After all, public international law is 
the branch of international law aimed at governing state behavior, and the courts with which 
international relations scholars are most familiar—such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)—adjudicate disputes involving states. 
 
IL/IR scholarship has paid relatively little attention to other areas of law and other types of courts 
which, while perhaps less familiar to some international relations scholars, are just as important 
to international relations—and perhaps more important—than public international law and 
international courts. 
 
Moreover, even as international relations scholars who conceive of their field as “world politics” 
are increasingly bringing non-state actors into their research, IL/IR has tended to neglect those 
areas of law that are most relevant to non-state actors, transnational relations, and private global 
governance. In addition, international relations scholars, applying the traditional distinction 
between anarchical international politics and hierarchical domestic politics, have sometimes 
treated international law and international courts as if they were categorically different from 
domestic law and domestic courts, even as the domestic–international divide is decreasingly 
salient in political science more generally. 
 
But this is changing. There is now a move beyond IL/IR into a new stage of interdisciplinary 
scholarship that this article will call “Law and World Politics” (L/WP). Moving beyond the “IL” 
in IL/IR scholarship, scholars are increasingly studying the ways that domestic law and domestic 
courts play not only an indirect role in international relations by providing foundations for 
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international law and international courts, but also a direct role in international relations. Moving 
beyond the “IR” in IR/IL scholarship, scholars are studying areas of law (such as conflict of laws 
and private international law) and types of dispute resolution bodies (such as arbitral tribunals) 
that regulate the activity of non-state actors and define the scope of state support for private 
forms of global governance. And moving beyond the domestic–international divide, scholars are 
increasingly rejecting “international law exceptionalism”—the notion that international law is 
categorically different from domestic law—and are beginning to take advantage of theoretical 
convergence across the domestic, comparative, and international subfields of political science to 
develop a better general understanding of the relationship between law and politics. 
 
This article’s main goal is to map out L/WP scholarship by examining these three trends. It also 
aims to facilitate further L/WP research by describing several areas of law, including foreign 
relations law, conflict of laws, transnational commercial arbitration, and international investment 
law, that may be unfamiliar to some political scientists, and explaining why they are relevant to 
international relations and to world politics more broadly. The article proceeds in five sections. 
The first two sections provide background by clarifying the definition of international law 
(Section 1) and briefly surveying the historical evolution of political science research on 
international law (Section 2). The last three sections review more recent scholarship to illustrate 
how L/WP research is moving beyond international law (Section 3), beyond international 
relations (Section 4), and beyond international law exceptionalism (Section 5). 
 
1. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATED CONCEPTS 
 
IL/IR scholars have focused on international law and, more specifically, on one type of 
international law: public international law. They have not, however, always defined international 
law in the same way. Therefore, it may be helpful to begin by clarifying the definition of 
international law. International relations scholars often define international law in terms of the 
subjects to which it applies and the scope of activity it governs. Traditionally, this meant 
international law was the “law of nations,” or the rules that apply to states (the subjects) in their 
relations with each other (the scope). 
 
But there are two problems with this type of definition. First, definitions based on subjects and 
scope are unstable. International law’s subjects and scope have varied historically. The subjects 
of international law have expanded to include non-state actors (e.g., individuals are subjects of 
international criminal law) and the scope of international law reaches beyond relations between 
states (e.g., international human rights law governs how states treat their citizens). Second, there 
are types of norms other than international law—including other legally binding norms such as 
domestic law (sometimes referred to by international lawyers as “municipal law”) and non-
legally binding norms—that may also apply to states as subjects (e.g., many aspects of 
constitutional law) and govern the same activity as international law (e.g., the conduct of 
diplomacy and the use of military force). Therefore, definitions based solely on subjects and 
scope cannot effectively distinguish international law from other types of law or from non-
legally binding norms. 
 
It may be more useful to define international law in terms of its sources, which include treaties, 
customary international law, and general principles of law. This is what international lawyers 
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and international courts ordinarily mean when they use the term “international law,” and this is 
how international law defines itself in its doctrine of sources, the most authoritative statement of 
which is Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) (Crawford, 2012; 
Jennings & Watts, 1996; Shaw, 2008). Article 38(1) provides as follows: 
 
The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes 
as are submitted to it, shall apply: 
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules 
expressly recognized by the contesting states; 
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the 
most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law. 
 
A definition of international law in terms of its widely accepted sources builds on the 
comparatively stable practical understanding of what counts as binding international law, and 
can be agnostic about (and therefore accommodate) variability in subject and scope while 
distinguishing international law from other types of international norms. 
 
Treaties (also commonly called “conventions”) are legally binding written agreements between 
two or more states, and can be either bilateral or multilateral. The rules governing treaties—
including treaty making, entry into force of treaties, reservations, treaty validity, and the 
interpretation, amendment and termination of treaties—are codified in the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties, the so-called “treaty on treaties” (Aust, 2014). IL/IR scholarship has focused 
largely on treaties, including their design and their influence on state behavior. 
 
Customary international law consists of rules that are derived from the conduct of states (“state 
practice”) and accepted by them as legally binding (a sense of legal obligation or “opinio juris”) 
(International Law Commission, 2016). Customary international law rules are often difficult to 
identify. However, it is generally understood that to establish that a rule is a customary 
international law rule, both state practice and opinio juris must be demonstrated. The greater the 
duration, consistency, and generality of the practice, the stronger the evidence that the state 
practice requirement is fulfilled. As to opinio juris, international courts sometimes insist on 
rigorous evidence that states follow a rule out of a sense of legal obligation, and sometimes they 
are willing to infer opinio juris from general practice. Once established, a customary 
international law rule is legally binding on all states, except states that persistently objected to 
the rule before its establishment and, for regional customary international law rules, states 
outside the relevant region (Crawford, 2012). IL/IR scholars have so far paid less attention to 
customary international law than to treaties (Dunoff & Pollack, 2013). 
 
General principles of law are principles of law that are recognized by the world’s major legal 
systems (Cheng, 2006; Kotuby & Sobota, 2017). There are two views, not necessarily mutually 
exclusive, about how to establish that a given principle is a legally binding general principle of 
law. One is to demonstrate that a principle is shared by all or a majority of the world’s domestic 
legal systems and to adapt the principle to the international context, while another is to 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3170066 
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demonstrate that it can be derived from the character of the international legal system itself 
(Crawford, 2012; Murphy, 2012; Thirlway, 2014). International lawyers and international courts 
ordinarily consider general principles of law as filling gaps left by treaties and customary 
international law, particularly in procedural matters (such as evidence and judicial process), and 
there is a tendency to view them as less important than the other two types of international law 
(Shaw, 2008). 
 
The reference to “judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists” 
does not mean that courts and scholars can directly create international law. To the contrary, 
Article 38(1)(d) states that these are “subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.” 
Thus, international lawyers and international courts often use domestic court decisions, 
international court decisions, and the research of scholars and institutions of international law 
(notably, the United Nations International Law Commission) as evidence that a given rule is or is 
not an international law rule, or to ascertain the content of a rule (Buergenthal & Murphy, 2013). 
Article 38(1)(d) refers to Article 59 of the ICJ Statute, which states that “[t]he decision of the 
Court has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case.” 
Nevertheless, international courts often follow their own and each other’s conclusions about 
international law, even if they are not legally required to do so. 
 
Another advantage of a definition of international law based on sources is that it is not limited to 
public international law. Although there is not consistent usage even among international legal 
scholars, public international law may be understood as international law that governs state 
behavior, including international relations and the treatment of individuals by states. Given 
international relations scholarship’s traditional state-centric focus, IL/IR scholarship has focused 
quite narrowly on this type of international law. But international law can also have important 
implications for non-state actors, including individuals and businesses. For example, there are 
many treaties governing matters ranging from adoption and child abduction to wills and 
contracts, many of which have been developed by The Hague Conference on Private 
International Law. There also are treaties and European Union regulations in the field of conflict 
of laws, the field which, in private matters with connections to two or more states, determines 
which state’s courts have jurisdiction, which state’s laws govern, and whether one state will 
enforce a judgment of another state’s court. These branches of international law are commonly 
referred to as private international law (Janis, 2008; Whytock, 2016). The boundaries between 
public and private international law are not always clear—for example, the Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards might be considered an example of 
hybrid public-private international law, as it is a treaty that supports a private form of dispute 
resolution (arbitration) by imposing on states obligations to enforce arbitration agreements and 
arbitral awards. And conflict-of-laws rules allocate governance authority among states, but are 
applied in private litigation. The point remains that an advantage of a sources-based definition of 
international law is that it does not include or exclude international law based simply on whether 
it is categorized as “public” or “private.” 
 
Although treaties, customary international law, and general principles are the three well-
established types of international law, there are theoretical debates about whether there are other 
sources of international law that currently or may one day exist (Thirlway, 2014). Moreover, 
international law does not include all international norms. To the contrary, non-legally binding 
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norms are pervasive and important in world politics (Kratochwil, 1989; Finnemore & Sikkink, 
1998; Sandholtz & Stiles, 2009). Some scholars refer to these non-legally binding norms as “soft 
law” (Guzman & Meyer, 2010; Pollack & Shaffer, 2013). 
 
Without doubting the importance of these norms, others scholars find it analytically preferable to 
refer to them simply as “non-legally binding norms” to guard against conflating them with 
legally binding international law (Raustiala, 2005; Murphy, 2012; Childress, Ramsey, & 
Whytock, 2015). One of the most important questions for political scientists, legal scholars, and 
policy makers is whether “legal norms, as a type, operate differently from any other kinds of 
norms in world politics” (Finnemore, 2000; see also Slaughter Burley, 1993). This inquiry 
requires an analytical distinction between what is and is not law. Even if the law of sources does 
not always yield obvious answers to what is and is not international law, it offers a well-
established point of departure that is consistent with how international law itself defines what is 
legally binding and with how international lawyers and international courts themselves analyze 
which norms are legally binding. 
 
Political scientists have proposed concepts that are related to, but not the same as, international 
law. These include the concepts of “legalization,” which refers to “a particular set of 
characteristics that institutions may (or may not) possess,” namely obligation, precision, and 
delegation (Abbott et al., 2000), and “judicialization,” which is “the infusion of judicial decision-
making and of courtlike procedures into political arenas where they did not previously reside” 
(Tate & Vallinder, 1995). These concepts have already proven to be valuable for improving 
understanding of certain aspects of world politics. Other political scientists and legal scholars, 
however, have criticized these concepts for being based on excessively narrow understandings of 
law (Finnemore & Toope, 2001). The essential point is that the concepts of legalization and 
judicialization are different from the concept of international law. Which concept to use depends 
on one’s research question. 
 
2. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICAL SCIENCE 
 
Political scientists have been studying international law since the birth of political science as a 
discipline. In the United States, for example, when the American Political Science Association 
(APSA) was founded in 1903, its constitution defined the organization’s goal as “the 
encouragement of the scientific study of Politics, Public Law, Administration and Diplomacy,” 
and “international law and diplomacy” was one of its seven founding subfields (Schmidt, 1998). 
 
Since then, political science research on international law has developed in five stages. First, 
during a pre-World War II formalist stage, political scientists—not unlike their colleagues in law 
schools—focused largely on analysis of international law’s jurisprudential underpinnings and 
historical development and on systematic description of its content (Gettell, 1910; Wright, 1922; 
Fenwick, 1924). Second, in a realist stage, political scientists challenged the formalist approach 
by insisting on the importance of international law’s social and political context, including the 
role of state power, in explaining the creation and impact of international law. One product of the 
realist stage was a deep skepticism about the role of international law in the realm of high 
politics, but without denying international law’s influence in less politically salient fields of 
activity (Carr, 1939; Morgenthau, 1940, 1978; Niemeyer, 1941). In a third, theoretical stage, 
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political scientists moved beyond the realist critique of international law by using various 
theoretical approaches, including bureaucratic decision-making theory and systems theory, to 
develop accounts of how international law can play a role in international relations (Kaplan & de 
Katzenbach, 1961; Deutsch & Hoffmann, 1968; Falk, 1970; Bull, 2002). The fourth international 
conflicts stage, more empirical but driven by legal scholars more than by political scientists, 
moved from theory to case-study research on the role of international law in international 
conflicts, the very realm of international relations where realists had the most doubt about a 
significant role for international law (Bowie, 1974; Chayes, 1974; Ehrlich, 1974; Finnegan, Junn, 
& Wilson, 1979; Henkin, 1979; Boyle, 1985; Forsythe, 1990). 
 
The fifth and current international law and international relations (IL/IR) stage of research on 
international law is a joint enterprise of legal scholars and international relations scholars. The 
emergence and refinement of three paradigms of international relations as alternatives to realism 
contributed to the reinvigoration of political science scholarship on international law in this fifth 
phase: institutionalism (Keohane, 1984, 1997), constructivism (Kratochwil, 1989; Onuf, 1989; 
Wendt, 1992), and liberalism (Slaughter, 1995; Moravcsik, 1997). Among the seminal works of 
IL/IR scholarship are Abbott (1989) and Burley (1992). Although the research in this current 
phase is diverse, it has tended to emphasize the creation of international law, including the 
emergence and evolution of international legal norms and the design of treaties (e.g., Finnemore 
& Sikkink, 1998; Koremenos, 2005; Raustiala, 2005; Sandholtz, 2007; Johns, 2014); state 
compliance with international law (e.g., Guzman, 2008; Simmons, 2000; Von Stein, 2005); and 
international courts (e.g., Helfer & Slaughter, 1997; Stone Sweet & Brunell, 1998; Cichowski, 
2007; Alter, 2014; Johns, 2015). Substantively, IL/IR has focused largely on three areas of law: 
human rights (e.g., Hafner-Burton, 2009; Simmons, 2009), international economic law (e.g., 
Busch & Reinhardt, 2000; Simmons, 2000), and international conflict (e.g., Huth, Croco, & 
Appel, 2011). Methodologically, it complements the theoretical and case-study orientations of 
earlier stages of political science research with the use of statistical analysis to test hypotheses 
about the role of law in international relations (e.g., Simmons, 2000; Kelley, 2007). 
 
There are already many excellent and comprehensive reviews of the IL/IR stage of 
interdisciplinary research on international law (e.g., Beck, Arend, and Vander Lugt (1996), 
Slaughter, Tulumello, and Wood (1998), Raustiala and Slaughter (2002), Slaughter (2004a), 
Byers (2008), Hafner-Burton, Victor, and Lupu (2012), Shaffer and Ginsburg (2012), Simmons 
(2012), and Dunoff and Pollack (2013)). It would make little sense to duplicate them here. 
 
Therefore, the remainder of this article focuses on an emerging sixth stage of interdisciplinary 
research, which this article refers to as “Law and World Politics” (L/WP), to distinguish it from 
three tendencies in IL/IR scholarship: (1) a focus on one type of law, international law 
(especially public international law), and one type of court, international courts (the “IL” in 
IL/IR); (2) a focus on state behavior (the “IR” in IL/IR); and (3) a certain international law 
exceptionalism in the form of a tendency to treat international law and domestic law as different 
in kind. L/WP scholarship pushes against these implicit borders of IL/IR scholarship. First, 
L/WP moves beyond the “IL” in IL/IR by pushing against “public international law-centrism” 
and “international court-centrism” and incorporating the role of private international law, 
domestic law, domestic courts, and other domestic legal institutions in international relations. 
Second, moving beyond the “IR” in IL/IR, L/WP scholarship adopts the “world politics” 
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paradigm that is increasingly influential in political science, by incorporating law governing not 
only international relations, but also transnational relations. Third, L/WP scholarship rejects a 
conception of international law as sui generis or different in kind from domestic law. 
Challenging international law exceptionalism, L/WP scholarship is focusing on the similar 
structures and functions of international law and domestic law to theorize across the domestic– 
international divide, with the goal of developing a deeper understanding of the relationship 
between law and politics. 
 
Dunoff and Pollack (2014) argue that “IL/IR has not developed as a truly interdisciplinary field, 
but instead has primarily involved the application of IR theories and methods to the study of 
international legal phenomena.” For this reason, they argue, “IR scholarship is insufficiently 
attentive to the practical realities and theoretical complexities of the international legal order—a 
deficiency that can and should be addressed through greater attention to international legal 
scholarship, and through genuinely interdisciplinary research”—through “reversing field,” as 
they call it. As this article will show, L/WP “reverses field” by drawing on legal knowledge not 
only in international legal scholarship but also other areas of legal scholarship that are generally 
less familiar to international relations scholars, such as foreign relations law, conflict of laws, 
international investment law, and private international law. 
 
3. BEYOND INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC LAW AND 
 DOMESTIC LEGAL INSTITUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
 
As the “IL” in IL/IR suggests, IL/IR scholarship focuses primarily on one type of law, 
international law, and one type of court, international courts (Dunoff & Pollack, 2013). Two 
streams L/WP scholarship are moving beyond international law and international courts—that is, 
beyond the “IL” in IL/IR scholarship—by incorporating domestic law and domestic legal 
institutions into the study of international relations. The first aims to improve accounts of the role 
of international law and international courts in international relations by incorporating into those 
accounts the domestic legal foundations of international law and international courts. The second 
stream breaks more sharply from the current IL/IR research agenda by focusing on the role of 
domestic law and domestic courts as independently significant in international relations, apart 
from their role as foundations for international law and international courts. 
 
3.1 The Domestic Legal Foundations of International Law 
 
The first stream of L/WP research retains IL/IR’s primary focus on the role of international law 
and international courts in international relations, but turns to domestic law and domestic legal 
institutions to help explain that role. While the role of international law and international courts 
in international relations remains the primary explanandum in this line of research, the domestic 
legal foundations of international law and international courts are increasingly part of the 
explanans. This line of research recognizes what international legal scholars have long 
understood: that domestic law and domestic courts are foundational to international law 
development, international law application, international law compliance, and the effectiveness 
of international courts (Shelton, 2011). 
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International Law Development 
 
First, domestic law and domestic courts are foundations of international law development. 
Domestic legal rules structure states’ internal processes for treaty making, determining, among 
other things, which domestic political actors participate in the treaty-making process and which 
have a right to approve a treaty once it has been negotiated. These rules vary cross-nationally. In 
some states, at least some treaties may be made by the head of state or head of government alone. 
For example, in the United States, sole executive agreements may be made with other states on 
the authority of the president alone (Bradley, 2013). In other states, domestic law allows the head 
of state or government to take the initiative to negotiate treaties with other states, but it requires 
legislative approval prior to ratification. Some states with bicameral legislatures require both 
houses to approve, while others require only one (Shelton, 2011). For example, treaties made 
under Article II of the U.S. Constitution must be approved by two-thirds of the Senate, whereas 
executive-legislative agreements must be approved by a majority of both houses of Congress. 
 
Interdisciplinary scholars have started to study how domestic legal rules regarding legislative 
approval of treaties influence states’ treaty-making behavior. One stream of research focuses on 
how these rules affect the form of international agreements. In the U.S. context, for example, 
studies have examined how these rules interact with domestic and international political factors 
to influence the president’s choice among sole executive agreements, executive-legislative 
agreements, and Article II treaties (Setear, 2002; Martin, 2005; Hathaway, 2008). As Cope 
(2017) explains, legislatures “are involved in nearly every stage of treaty creation . . . [and thus] 
meaningfully impact how their states influence . . . international law.” 
 
Another stream of research uses cross-national analysis to shed light on the domestic legal 
factors that influence treaty ratification. This raises a point of terminology: Although domestic 
approval of treaties is sometimes called “ratification,” the term technically refers to a method by 
which a state may express its consent to be bound by a treaty. A state’s domestic law may 
require legislative approval of a treaty before the state can ratify it (or otherwise express its 
consent to be bound by it), but domestic approval and ratification are distinct and should not be 
confused. Treaties do not enter into force until the required number of states have expressed their 
consent to be bound by the treaty, and this consent is commonly indicated by ratification (Aust, 
2010). Therefore, states’ expression of consent to be bound—including by ratification—is a 
critical step in the treaty-making process. Simmons (2009) presents evidence that “the higher the 
ratification hurdle under domestic law, the less likely a government will be to ratify an 
international human rights agreement, even if it is sympathetic to its contents,” and Haftel and 
Thompson (2013) find that the stricter a state’s domestic legal requirements for legislative 
approval of treaties, the longer it takes for the state to ratify bilateral investment treaties. 
 
Other research reveals a relationship between states’ legal traditions (such as common law or 
civil law) and treaty-making behavior. Simmons (2009) finds that states with domestic legal 
traditions based on common law are less likely than other states to ratify human rights treaties 
and more likely to make reservations to those treaties that they do ratify. Zartner (2014) finds 
that states with a civil law tradition are more likely than states with other legal traditions to ratify 
human rights treaties and environmental treaties. In contrast, in the context of bilateral 
investment treaties, Haftel and Thompson (2013) find that countries with common law systems 
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are faster to ratify than countries with other legal traditions, and suggest “that the effect of 
common law on international agreements is more complex than was initially thought.” 
 
Far more could be learned about the domestic legal foundations of treaty-based cooperation in 
international relations by using more sophisticated comparative data on domestic legal rules. An 
impressive dataset created by Verdier and Versteeg (2015, 2017) promises to open new avenues 
for such research. Their data includes detailed information about domestic legal rules governing 
treaty-making procedures for more than 100 countries from 1815 to 2013. 
  
Beyond treaties, domestic law can also influence the creation and evolution of two other types of 
international law: customary international law and general principles of law. As noted above, the 
two required elements of a rule of customary international law are state practice and opinio juris 
(a sense of legal obligation). Domestic law might serve as evidence of either or both of these 
elements (Shaw, 2008). Domestic law also contributes to general principles, insofar as 
determining whether a putative general principle of law exists involves an exercise in 
comparative legal analysis to determine whether the principle is indeed common to the world’s 
major legal systems (Janis, 2008). In these ways, domestic law can be understood as at least 
partially constitutive of these two types of international law. 
 
Domestic courts also contribute to the development of international law. For example, domestic 
courts examine evidence of state practice and opinio juris to determine whether a putative rule of 
customary international law exists. These domestic court determinations may then be used as 
evidence of international law in later situations (Crawford, 2012; International Law Commission, 
2016). This is one sense in which judicial decisions are, as Article 38(1)(d) of the ICJ Statute 
provides, a “subsidiary means for the determination of rules of [international] law.” In this way, 
domestic courts “help mold rules through the collection of evidence of customary international 
law or the general principles of law” (Janis, 2008). Domestic courts also contribute to the 
development of international law insofar as their decisions constitute state practice, which, along 
with a sense of legal obligation, is necessary for the establishment of customary international law 
(Conforti, 1993; Shaw, 2008). According to one recent study, the number of domestic court 
decisions on matters of international law “easily outnumbers the decisions of international courts 
and tribunals” (Nollkaemper, 2012). It would therefore seem that political scientists interested in 
the development of international law should focus as closely—if not even more closely—on 
domestic courts as on international courts. 
 
Domestic Implementation and Application of International Law 
 
Domestic law and domestic courts also play a fundamental role in determining whether and how 
international law will be implemented and applied domestically. For example, domestic legal 
rules govern the circumstances in which international law has domestic legal effect within states. 
These rules vary cross-nationally. Often this variation is described in a very rough binary 
fashion, with “monist” states in which international law is automatically deemed part of and 
perhaps supreme to domestic law, and “dualist” states in which domestic legal systems and the 
international legal system are considered separate, with a given rule of international law being 
part of domestic law only when domestic law itself establishes that (Shaw, 2008). 
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3170066 
10 
 
In fact, these rules vary in more complex ways than the monist/dualist distinction suggests 
(Crawford, 2012). One dimension of variation is the required steps for international law to have 
domestic effect, ranging from automatic effect to a requirement that international law be 
implemented through domestic legislation before it has domestic legal effect. To give one 
example, under U.S. law, a distinction is made between self- executing treaties (which have 
automatic domestic effect as judicially enforceable federal law upon ratification) and non-self-
executing treaties (which are binding on the United States on the international plane, but require 
implementing legislation in order for them to be judicially enforceable) (Bradley, 2013). Another 
dimension of variation is the extent to which international law takes priority over domestic law. 
For example, domestic law— often domestic constitutional law—may or may not make treaties 
superior to legislation and may or may not make customary international law directly applicable 
in the domestic legal system (Ginsburg, Chernykh, & Elkins, 2008). In states that give treaties 
and legislation equal status, conflicts are generally resolved with a later-in-time rule, whereby 
the more recent of the two rules prevails (Shelton, 2011). Suggesting yet another dimension, in 
their study of international law in U.S. courts, Sloss and Van Alstine (2017) find that “the 
willingness of national courts to view an international issue as one of law— and thus within their 
realm of authority notwithstanding the political implications— depends heavily on the subject 
matter of the legal rule involved,” namely on “whether an international legal rule regulates the 
‘horizontal’ relations between states, the cross- border ‘transnational’ relations between private 
actors, or the ‘vertical’ relations between states and private actors.” 
 
The rules governing domestic implementation and application are different for treaties and for 
customary international law. The Verdier and Versteeg dataset mentioned above includes 
extensive cross-national data on the domestic rules governing the domestic legal status of treaties 
and customary international law. Importantly, the data are based not only on constitutional rules 
but also rules found in statutes and case law. As the authors put it, their approach allows them “to 
move beyond traditional monist-dualist classifications and provide a more nuanced exploration 
of how countries address international law in their domestic legal systems” (Verdier & Versteeg, 
2015). This data will help interdisciplinary scholars better understand the domestic legal 
microfoundations of domestic implementation and application of international law and how they 
interact with political factors. 
 
Domestic legal rules and domestic courts also play a foundational role in the domestic 
implementation and application of international law through the processes of treaty interpretation 
(Aust & Nolte, 2016). Treaty interpretation is an important function because the meaning of 
treaties (like other types of law) is often ambiguous. Different states may have different 
interpretations of the rights and obligations created by the same treaty. This means that the 
domestic implementation and application of the same treaty by different states may, in effect, 
lead to the internalization of different norms in those states. As discussed below, these 
interpretive processes also have implications for state compliance with international law. 
 
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) contains principles of treaty 
interpretation. However, states may have rules of treaty interpretation that are not necessarily 
consistent with the VCLT, and domestic courts and other domestic legal actors may interpret and 
apply the VCLT’s principles in different ways (Bradley, 2013). A sophisticated understanding of 
treaty interpretation by states thus depends on understanding the domestic rules and domestic 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3170066 
11 
 
legal actors that are part of the treaty interpretation process. Domestic law also allocates states’ 
internal international law interpretation authority. In most states, domestic courts are understood 
to be the principal interpreters of treaties (Shelton, 2011). But in other states—including the 
United States—domestic courts give considerable deference to the executive branch’s views on 
the proper interpretation of a treaty (Bradley, 2013). Domestic courts may also give weight to the 
interpretive decisions of the domestic courts of other treaty signatories, giving rise to “a corpus 
of national court decisions . . . that implements, refines, and develops international law” 
(Murphy, 2012). For these and other reasons, domestic courts likely have “a more profound 
effect for the actual application of international law . . . than do the decisions of international 
courts and tribunals” (Nollkaemper, 2012). 
 
Greater attention to cross-national variation in how states interpret treaties would allow scholars 
to develop a better understanding of how those rules interact with international legal rules of 
treaty interpretation to influence domestic implementation and application of treaties. Conant 
(2013) takes an important step in this direction by developing a theoretical account of the factors 
that influence how domestic courts interpret international law. 
 
Interdisciplinary scholars are also beginning to study the role of legislatures in domestic 
implementation and application of international law. As Cope (2017) convincingly argues, 
legislatures “are involved in nearly every stage of treaty . . . operation, including their . . . 
interpretation, implementation, and application. In playing these multiple roles, legislatures 
meaningfully impact how their states influence and respond to international law.” 
 
International Law Compliance 
 
Domestic courts and other domestic legal actors can contribute to (or inhibit) state compliance 
with international law. As Conforti (1993) notes, “compliance with international law relies not so 
much on enforcement mechanisms available at the international level, but rather on the resolve 
of domestic legal operators such as public servants and judges to use to their limits the 
mechanisms provided by municipal law to ensure compliance with international norms.” Two 
mechanisms of state compliance with international law depend heavily on domestic courts: 
domestic enforcement and internalization. 
 
Technically, neither domestic courts nor international courts can enforce international law (or 
any law) by themselves because they lack the tools of force to do so. However, they can and 
often do contribute to enforcement by applying international law, finding conduct in violation of 
international law, and then ordering compliance or requesting enforcement measures by other 
bodies (such as the executive branch of a government). Moreover, by interpreting treaties, 
domestic courts—especially those that enjoy a degree of judicial independence—may limit the 
ability of other domestic actors to engage in self-serving auto-interpretation of international legal 
rules, thereby contributing to compliance. 
 
According to transnational legal process theory, an even more fundamental process leading to 
compliance is internalization. As Koh argues, the key to state obedience to international law is a 
process of “interaction and interpretation whereby international norms become domesticated and 
internalized into domestic law” (Koh, 1997). One of the principal forms of internalization is 
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judicial internalization, whereby “litigation in domestic courts provokes judicial incorporation of 
international law norms into domestic law, statutes, or constitutional norms” (Koh, 1997). 
Litigation in domestic courts is a process consistent with the spiral model of human rights 
change proposed by Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink (2013). 
 
Building on these insights, interdisciplinary scholars have started to analyze how cross- national 
variation in domestic law and domestic legal institutions affect compliance with international 
law. Sandholtz (2012) finds that states have better human rights performance when they have 
constitutional rules making treaties directly applicable in domestic courts. Verdier and 
Versteeg’s (2015, 2017) detailed cross-national data on the legal rules governing the status of 
treaties in domestic law promises to facilitate further studies of the impact of those rules on 
compliance. 
 
Regarding domestic courts, numerous studies reveal a relationship between domestic judicial 
independence and international law compliance, including Keith (2002, 2011), Simmons (2009), 
Lupu (2013), and Crabtree and Nelson (2017). Hafner-Burton, Helfer, and Fariss (2011) find that 
states where domestic courts exercise strong oversight of the executive are more likely to 
derogate from human rights commitments than other states. Powell and Staton (2009) find that 
the less effective a state’s domestic judiciary, the more likely it is to both ratify and violate the 
Convention Against Torture. Helfer and Voeten (2014) find that the impact of European Court of 
Human Rights judgments on LGBT policies depends on factors including whether a state’s 
courts have the authority to review whether domestic laws and policies violate civil and political 
rights (including rights protected by the European Convention on Human Rights). Baumgartner 
(2011) finds that states with certain domestic court access rights perform better in at least some 
fields of human rights. 
 
Beyond domestic courts, another domestic legal institution may play a supporting role in 
international law compliance: legislatures. Hillebrecht (2012) emphasizes not only domestic 
courts but also legislative actors in her study of compliance with human rights treaties. Lupu 
(2015) finds that the positive impact of human rights treaties increases when a state has more 
legislative veto players. Cope (2017) shows how legislatures can bring states into (or out of) 
compliance with treaty obligations—for example, by adopting legislation that conforms to (or 
violates) those obligations. 
 
Beyond domestic courts and legislatures, interdisciplinary scholars have found that domestic law 
and states’ domestic legal traditions affect compliance. Dancy and Michel (2016) find that states 
with private prosecution rights in their criminal procedure codes (which allow a victim and/or 
their relatives to initiate and participate in the criminal investigation and prosecution of a crime) 
have, on average, 42% more trials of state agents in any given year, and 38.6% more convictions, 
for human rights violations, even after controlling for various other factors including judicial 
independence. Jo and Simmons (2016) find that the deterrent effect of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) on intentional civilian killing by state actors depends in part on whether states have 
ICC-consistent domestic criminal statutes. In an in-depth comparative analysis, Zartner (2014) 
provides evidence that a state’s legal tradition (common law, civil law, Islamic law, East Asian 
law, or mixed) influences its policy toward international law by facilitating or hindering 
internalization of international law. Mitchell, Ring, and Spellman (2013) find that states with 
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common law traditions engage in better human rights practices than states with other legal 
systems. 
 
The role of domestic law and domestic legal institutions in compliance raises other research 
questions for empirical examination. Under what circumstances will domestic courts order 
enforcement when they find that there has been a violation of international law? Under what 
circumstances will enforcement bodies themselves comply with judicial enforcement orders? 
Under what circumstances do parties comply with domestic court decisions ordering compliance, 
even in the absence of an enforcement order? Under what circumstances do courts internalize 
international law by incorporating it into common law or using international law as an aid in 
interpreting domestic law, and under what circumstances do legislators internalize international 
law by implementing it through legislation? Answering these questions will require drawing on 
political science theories of domestic and comparative politics—including judicial decision-
making theory and theories of legislative behavior—to shed light on the factors influencing the 




Like international law, international courts have domestic legal foundations. These foundations 
are at least threefold. First, domestic legal institutions affect the creation of international courts. 
For example, Mitchell and Powell (2011) find that states’ legal traditions (civil law, common 
law, or Islamic law) influence how they design new international courts (as well as which pre-
existing international courts they join and the durability of their commitments to international 
courts). 
 
Second, domestic legal institutions contribute to the caseload of international courts. Whether a 
state consents or declines to consent to the jurisdiction of an international court is a foreign 
policy decision made through a process governed by domestic law. Moreover, domestic courts 
can also contribute (or not) to the caseload of international courts such as the Court of Justice of 
the European Union (CJEU) by referring to them disputes about the meaning of international law 
(Stone Sweet & Brunell, 1998; Helfer & Alter, 2009). 
 
Third, and closely related, domestic law and domestic courts play a crucial role in determining 
the effectiveness and influence of international courts (Slaughter Burley, 1993; Alter, 2014). 
Studies have found this to be the case for the CJEU and its predecessor, the European Court of 
Justice (Burley & Mattli, 1993; Helfer & Slaughter, 1997; Stone Sweet & Brunell, 1998; Alter, 
2001). For example, when an international court asserts jurisdiction and decides a dispute, 
domestic courts may either recognize—and perhaps also order enforcement of—the international 
court’s decision (thus supporting the international court’s claim to authority), or it may decline to 
do so (thus challenging the international court’s authority) (Whytock, 2009A). Domestic court 
recognition of an international court decision may increase the likelihood of compliance because 
“governments find it much harder to disobey their own courts compared to international 
tribunals” (Weiler, 1994). As political scientists have noted, however, domestic court support for 
international courts is not inevitable (Alter, 2001). Further research could inquire into the factors 
that determine levels of domestic court support. 
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3.2 The Direct Role: Domestic Law and Domestic Courts in International Relations 
 
The second stream of L/WP research that is moving beyond the “IL” in IL/IR scholarship 
focuses on the direct role of domestic law, domestic courts, and other domestic legal institutions 
in international relations, separately from their role in supporting international law and 
international courts. This line of research has, for example, examined the relationship between 
domestic law and international conflict, as well as the political and legal determinants of 
domestic court decisionmaking in cases with implications for international relations. In legal 
studies, the domestic laws and legal institutions that are relevant to these lines of inquiry are part 
of the subfield known as “foreign relations law,” which is related to but distinct from 
international law (Henkin, 1996; Ramsey, 2007; Franck, Glennon, Murphy, & Swaine, 2012; 
Bradley, 2013). 
 
Domestic Law and International Conflict 
 
International relations scholars have long been interested in the causes of international peace and 
conflict (Levy, 2002). They have already incorporated international law into their research on 
international peace and conflict (e.g., Simmons, 2002; Huth, Croco, & Appel, 2011). Because 
international law is familiar to many international law scholars, and because international law 
contains rules governing the use of force (e.g., Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter), this 
focus is unsurprising. 
 
There is, however, another type of law that is directly relevant to international peace and 
conflict: the domestic constitutional rules of states governing their use of force (Slaughter 
Burley, 1993). As one legal expert on constitutions and use-of-force decision making 
summarizes, “[n]ational constitutional law may have a constraining effect on the external 
behavior of states, both by restricting the circumstances in which military force may lawfully be 
deployed and by establishing the procedural framework for taking decisions to use force” 
(Damrosch, 2003). 
 
A leading political science theory of the “democratic peace”— that is, the observation that armed 
conflict is less likely between democracies than between a democracy and an autocracy or 
between autocracies—emphasizes the institutional constraints that democracies place on 
executive decisionmaking (Russett & Oneal, 2001). However, the data used to measure those 
constraints—such as the Polity scale (e.g., Schultz, 1999) and legislative veto points data (e.g., 
Choi, 2010)—do not capture constraints on use-of-force decision making specifically, which 
may be different from executive constraints in other policy areas. As a result, they are not ideal 
measures of theoretically relevant institutional constraints. 
 
Ku and Jacobson (2003), Ginsburg (2012, 2014B), and Mello (2014) are among the 
interdisciplinary scholars who have built on this work by specifically investigating the 
relationship between domestic constitutional rules governing the use of force and use-of- force 
decisionmaking. Ku and Jacobson (2003) provide a comparative analysis of the domestic 
processes for approving the use of military force under the auspices of international 
organizations (such as the United Nations and NATO) in Canada, France, Germany, India, 
Japan, Norway, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States and evaluate them from the 
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perspective of democratic accountability. They find that “[d]ecisions about the use of military 
forces in international operations have been shaped by national constitutions,” including 
requirements for legislative approval (Ku & Jacobson, 2003). 
 
Mello (2014) uses fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis of the constitutional and political 
features of 30 democracies to investigate the conditions under which they participated (or not) in 
the Kosovo War, Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, and Operation Iraqi Freedom. He 
examined two constitutional features: “constitutional restrictions” (measuring cross-national 
variation in constitutional limitations on the types of military operations that are legally 
permitted or prohibited) and “parliamentary veto rights” (measuring cross-national variation in 
constitutional rules regarding legislative involvement in use-of-force decisions). He finds that 
constitutional restrictions on the use of force are a “structural veto to military deployments, 
irrespective of political preferences or systemic influences” and that “[t]he absence of 
constitutional restrictions is a necessary condition for military participation in all three cases and 
across 30 democracies.” But he also finds that parliamentary veto rights do not have a discernible 
effect on the likelihood of participation (Mello, 2014). 
 
Ginsburg (2014b) examines cross-national data on constitutional rules governing legislative 
involvement in use-of-force decision making. He theorizes that legislative involvement 
“implicates a bargaining process between the executive and legislature” that can affect the 
likelihood of the use of force. Using data on 893 constitutions (from the Comparative 
Constitutions Project) and militarized interstate disputes (from the Correlates of War project), he 
presents evidence suggesting that constitutional rules involving the legislature in decisions to 
declare war reduces the likelihood that a state will initiate conflict (Ginsburg, 2014b). 
 
Other aspects of domestic law may also affect the onset and resolution of international conflict. 
For example, Powell (2015) focuses on the relationship between cross-national variation in the 
domestic legal features of Islamic law states and these states’ choices of dispute resolution 
methods in territorial disputes. She finds that “[s]ecular legal features . . . have the power to 
attract Islamic law states to the most formal international venues—arbitration and adjudication. 
On the other hand, states that embed holy oath in their constitution are unlikely to attempt 
resolution via international courts or arbitral tribunals, preferring instead less-formalized venues” 
(Powell, 2015). 
  
Judicial Foreign Policy 
 
Beyond international conflict, political scientists have long had a more general interest in foreign 
policy (Carlsnaes, 2013). Legal scholars have long studied the role of domestic courts in foreign 
policy processes (Henkin, 1996). As noted by Stephen Breyer, an associate justice of the U.S. 
Supreme Court, domestic courts are increasingly called upon “to consider foreign persons and 
activities, foreign commerce . . . and foreign threats to national security” (Breyer, 2015). Legal 
scholars call this “judicial foreign policy” (Dunfee & Freidman, 1984; Garvey, 1993; Sloss, 
2008). 
 
There are three types of judicial foreign policy: (1) judicial review of foreign policy, (2) judicial 
implementation of foreign policy, and (3) direct judicial foreign policy. A state’s domestic courts 
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engage in judicial review of foreign policy when they determine whether another branch’s 
foreign policy decision complies with the requirements of law, such as constitutionally protected 
individual rights and separation-of-powers principles or rules of international law (Sunstein, 
2008). 
 
Domestic courts also participate in the implementation of foreign policy. For example, domestic 
courts in some states implement legislative policy regarding the scope of foreign sovereign 
immunity. According to the doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity, a state is immune from 
being sued in the domestic courts of other states, subject to certain exceptions. A number of 
states—including Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States—have 
legislation embodying the general rule of immunity and defining the exceptions. Domestic courts 
in those states implement policies regarding foreign sovereign immunity by applying this 
legislation to determine whether or not to grant immunity to foreign states in particular cases. 
Domestic courts may also implement foreign policy when they take into account the views of the 
executive branch of government when deciding cases involving foreign relations. In the United 
States, for example, the executive branch may submit statements of interest or amicus briefs 
expressing its policy regarding particular cases. 
 
Even in cases that do not entail review of the validity of, or the implementation of, another 
branch’s foreign policy decisions, domestic courts frequently make decisions that affect the 
interests of foreign states (Buxbaum, 2016). In those cases, domestic courts make judgments 
about whether and how to consider foreign state interests and how to weigh those interests along 
with other legal, political, and policy considerations. When they do so, domestic courts can be 
understood as engaging in direct judicial foreign policy. 
 
Judicial foreign policy often entails direct interactions between domestic courts and foreign 
states. Those interactions may be involuntary on the part of the foreign state—for example, if it 
is a defendant in a lawsuit and objects to the court’s jurisdiction on foreign sovereign immunity 
grounds, but the court finds that an exception to immunity applies and allows the suit to proceed. 
As Buxbaum (2016) puts it, such cases “invoke[] a narrative in which the involvement of U.S. 
courts creates conflict—or potential conflict— with the interests of foreign governments, which 
in turn seek to fend off the intervention of U.S. courts to preserve their own sovereign 
autonomy.” Less widely recognized is that foreign states often initiate interactions with domestic 
courts voluntarily by filing lawsuits as plaintiffs. In these cases, foreign states choose to engage 
with domestic courts and “deploy the resources of that system to attain certain objectives” 
(Buxbaum, 2016). 
 
Even when a foreign state is neither a defendant nor a plaintiff, its interests may be affected, and 
for that reason, foreign states often submit amicus briefs conveying their positions in lawsuits to 
which they are not a party (Eichensehr, 2016). Domestic courts also engage in direct judicial 
foreign policy when they cooperate with foreign courts to resolve specific cross-border disputes, 
provide mutual legal assistance, or avoid duplicative litigation that could lead to conflicting 
judgments (Slaughter, 2004b). The line between implementation and direct judicial foreign 
policy is not always clear. Even when there are legislative foreign policy directives (e.g., 
legislation regarding foreign sovereign immunity), domestic courts often have considerable 
discretion on how to interpret such directives and apply them in particular situations. By 
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exercising that discretion, domestic courts not only implement but also contribute to the 
definition of foreign policy through processes of interpretation. 
 
Political scientists in the discipline’s domestic politics branch have long treated courts as 
important actors in policymaking processes (Dahl, 1957; Shapiro, 1981; Barnes, 2007), and one 
significant work from an earlier stage of political science research on international law analyzed 
one aspect of judicial foreign policy: the review by domestic courts of the legality of the acts of 
foreign states (Falk, 1964). Moreover, the virtues and drawbacks of judicial foreign policy are 
regularly debated in both legal and foreign affairs circles (Slaughter, 1997; Koh, 1990; Franck, 
1991, 1992; Slaughter & Bosco, 2000; Bork, 2003; Leval, 2013; Cabranas, 2015). Meanwhile, 
practical political and economic realities are giving domestic courts an increasingly important 
role in states’ responses to global problems (Breyer, 2015). As Michaels (2011) puts it, “We face 
an increasing number of problems that are essentially global in nature because they affect the 
world in its entirety: global cartels, climate change, crimes against humanity; to name a few. 
These problems require world courts, yet world courts in the institutional sense are largely 
lacking. Hence, domestic courts must function, effectively, as world courts. Given the 
unlikelihood of effective world courts in the future, the challenge is to establish under what 
conditions domestic courts can play this role of world courts effectively and legitimately.” 
 
Yet even though political scientists are, as noted above, increasingly studying the role of 
domestic courts in supporting international law and international courts, political scientists have 
devoted relatively little attention to domestic courts as independent actors involved in foreign 
policy. This is starting to change. Isaac Unah (1998), Jeffrey Davis (2006), Cass Sunstein (2008), 
Kirk Randazzo (2004, 2006, 2010), and Adam Chilton and Christopher Whytock (2016) are 
among the interdisciplinary scholars who are empirically investigating the determinants of 
various aspects of judicial foreign policy, and each of them has drawn on theory and methods 
from the judicial politics branch of political science to do so. In a book-length study, Unah 
(1998) analyzes the role of the United States Court of International Trade and the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit in the implementation of U.S. trade policy, and he identifies 
legal, political, and economic factors that influence the likelihood that courts will reverse agency 
action and the likelihood that their decisions will be protectionist. 
 
In an empirical analysis of U.S. District Court and U.S. Court of Appeals decisions in 
international human rights cases, Davis (2006) finds that the likelihood of a pro-human rights 
ruling is greater when the alleged violation is a personal integrity violation such as torture, when 
an interest group is representing the alleged victim, and when there is  legal precedent in the 
relevant judicial circuit that is favorable to human rights rulings. In contrast, he does not find that 
the ideology of judges significantly affects these decisions. In an empirical analysis of U.S. 
Court of Appeals decisions on national security matters, Sunstein (2008) finds that Republican 
appointees are less likely than Democratic appointees to invalidate executive and legislative 
action, and that invalidation rates did not significantly change after the 9/11 attacks. 
 
Randazzo (2010), building on his earlier work (Randazzo, 2004, 2006), combines theories of 
international relations and judicial decisionmaking with empirical analysis to analyze the legal 
and political factors that influence the decisions of U.S. federal court decisions in foreign policy 
matters, with a focus on the balance struck by the courts between liberty interests and national 
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security interests. He observes that after the September 11 attacks, the effect of the judges’ 
ideologies on their national security decisions became more pronounced, with liberal judges 
more likely to support civil liberties challenges to government policy than conservative judges 
(Randazzo, 2010). 
 
Drawing on both international relations theory and judicial decision-making theory, Chilton and 
Whytock (2016) empirically analyze the political and legal factors that influence foreign 
sovereign immunity decision making by the U.S. District Courts. They find that those courts are 
more likely to grant immunity to a foreign state that is sued in a U.S. court if the foreign state is a 
democracy. They also find that liberal judges are more likely to grant immunity than 
conservative judges and that two factors that are legally relevant according to the law of foreign 
sovereign immunity—the commercial nature of the foreign state’s activity and the connections 
between that activity and U.S. territory— affect the likelihood of immunity in the direction one 
would expect from the law. 
 
Taken together, these studies provide preliminary insights into the determinants of judicial 
foreign policy. However, they are limited by their focus on a relatively small range of judicial 
foreign policy issues and by their nearly exclusive focus on U.S. courts. This line of research 
could be advanced with studies of other examples of judicial foreign policy, and by cross-
national empirical research, to help develop more generalizable findings. 
 
4. BEYOND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: LAW, TRANSNATIONAL 
 RELATIONS, AND PRIVATE GOVERNANCE 
 
IL/IR scholarship has focused not simply on international law, but on one type of international 
law: public international law. As Simmons (2008) notes, the “overwhelming share” of political 
science research on international law has been on public international law. On the one hand, this 
emphasis on public international law is understandable: Given the international relations 
subfield’s traditionally state-centric orientation, public international law—which is the branch of 
international law aimed at governing state behavior—is a natural focus. 
 
On the other hand, IL/IR’s focus on public international law creates a mismatch with broader 
trends in political science. It has been decades since Nye and Keohane (1971) called for “a 
broader world politics paradigm”—one that encompasses not only international relations but also 
transgovernmental relations (cross-border relations between governmental subunits such as 
administrative agencies, courts, legislatures) and transnational relations (cross-border relations 
among private actors)—a call prominently renewed and refined by Risse-Kappen (1995). 
Although much international relations scholarship continues to focus on states, the broader world 
politics approach is well established (Keohane & Nye, 2001; Pollack & Shaffer, 2001), and 
much of it focuses on the behavior of private actors, including the role of private actors in 
governing transnational relations and the global economy (Cutler, Haufler, & Porter, 1999; Hall 
& Biersteker, 2002; Büthe, 2004; Graz & Nölke, 2008; Büthe & Mattli, 2011; Cutler & Dietz, 
2017). Moreover, liberal theories of international relations and international law provide 
theoretical foundations for attentiveness to nonstate actors (Slaughter Burley, 1993; Moravcsik, 
2013). 
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Consistent with this broader world politics trend in political science, L/WP research moves 
beyond the “IR” in IL/IR. So far it has done so by examining five areas of law that govern 
transnational relations and affect private governance: (1) the law of extraterritoriality, (2) conflict 
of laws, (3) private international law, (4) transnational commercial arbitration, and (5) 




Much and probably most transnational activity remains ungoverned (or only partially governed) 
by international law and international courts, and states find it politically difficult to create new 
international law and international courts. Therefore, states often to use their own domestic law 
and domestic courts to govern transnational activity (Putnam, 2009). As Kaczmarek and 
Newman (2011) put it, “[d]omestic law increasingly serves as an important element of global 
governance.” Because transnational activity by definition transcends any given state’s territory, 
this form of governance requires a state to assert authority to apply its law (prescriptive 
authority) or adjudicate disputes in its courts (adjudicative authority) extraterritorially. 
 
Kal Raustiala (2009), Tonya Putnam (2009), and Sarah Kaczmarek and Abraham Newman 
(2011) are among the interdisciplinary scholars who are empirically studying the causes and 
effects of extraterritoriality. In an in-depth historical analysis, Raustiala (2009) finds that 
assertions of extraterritorial authority by the United States have been influenced by its relative 
power in the international system, as well as by other changes in world politics and the global 
economy. For example, as a relatively weak state in its early history, the United States preferred 
a Westphalian territorial approach that might help protect it from other states’ assertions of 
extraterritorial authority; but, as the United States grew stronger, it became more willing to assert 
jurisdiction over actors and activity within the territory of other states and less committed to 
territoriality. 
 
In path-breaking research, Putnam (2009, 2016) analyzes an original dataset of 659 transnational 
disputes in the U.S. federal courts between 1945 and 2010, in which they decided whether to 
assert extraterritorial jurisdiction. Her data includes disputes involving 120 different states in 
issue areas ranging from antitrust, tax, intellectual property rights and labor, to racial and gender 
discrimination, torture, and other human rights violations. She finds that U.S. courts tend to 
apply U.S. law extraterritorially in two situations: “when extraterritorial conduct poses a threat to 
the functioning of U.S. law inside U.S. territory” and “when U.S. citizens and others with close 
U.S. ties are accused of violating a short list of rights at the core of American political identity . . 
. [including] the rights not to be subjected to torture, extrajudicial killing and other crimes 
against humanity, or forced labor” (Putnam, 2016). In addition, she explores how a state’s 
extraterritorial assertions of governance authority can influence international regulatory 
competition by exerting pressure on other states to change their own domestic law. 
 
Kaczmarek and Newman (2011) examine the relationship between the extraterritorial application 
of U.S. law and policy change in other states. Their empirical focus is on anti-bribery laws. Their 
dependent variable is whether a given state has prosecuted a case under its foreign bribery rules, 
and their key explanatory variable is whether the United States has previously brought bribery 
cases against that state’s firms or citizens. They find that U.S. application of its anti-bribery laws 
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in the territory of other states was associated with increased domestic enforcement of anti-
bribery standards in those other states, suggesting that the extraterritorial “application of 
domestic law can have significant international consequences” (Kaczmarek & Newman, 2011). 
 
Together, these studies provide some initial empirical evidence of the causes and consequences 
of extraterritorial assertions of prescriptive and adjudicative authority by states to govern 
transnational activity. Together, the Putnam (2016) and Kaczmarek and Newman (2011) studies 
draw attention to the direct role that domestic legal institutions can play in world politics. 
However, these studies have so far focused on U.S. assertions of extraterritorial governance 
authority and on particular issues areas. Cross-national analysis of extraterritoriality across a 
broader range of issue areas would help provide an empirical basis for more generalizable 
findings. One example of the promise of a comparative approach is Langer’s (2011) cross-
national study of assertions of universal jurisdiction by states in international criminal cases. 
 
4.2 Conflict of Laws 
 
Extraterritoriality decisions are decisions by a given state about whether it will assert governance 
authority over a particular transnational activity. But because transnational activity, by definition, 
has connections with more than one state’s citizens or territory, more than one state may have a 
legitimate claim to assert its authority. These overlaps of authority often make it necessary for 
courts to make decisions about which state’s domestic courts or domestic laws should govern 
transnational activity. The body of law that governs these decisions is called conflict of laws 
(Fawcett & Carruthers, 2008; Hay, Borchers, & Symeonides, 2010; Richman, Reynolds, & 
Whytock, 2013). 
 
In many legal systems outside the United States, conflict of laws is considered part of a broader 
field called private international law. However, the term private international law can be 
misleading because even though conflict-of-laws problems are transnational problems, most 
conflict-of-laws rules are part of the domestic law of states and vary cross-nationally rather than 
embodied in treaties or other types of international law. For this reason, this article discusses 
conflict of laws and private international law separately. 
 
Conflict of laws is generally understood as having three branches: jurisdiction, choice of law, 
and recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments (Hay, Borchers, & Symeonides, 2010). A 
domestic court applies the rules of jurisdiction to determine whether to assert authority to 
adjudicate a dispute arising from transnational activity. A domestic court applies choice-of-law 
rules to determine whether to apply its own domestic law or a foreign state’s law to transnational 
activity. And a domestic court applies the rules governing foreign judgments to determine 
whether to recognize or enforce the decisions of the courts of foreign states. These three 
branches correspond to three dimensions of global governance authority: authority to adjudicate, 
authority to prescribe, and authority to enforce (Kjaer, 2004; Whytock, 2009a). 
 
Conflict-of-laws rules help allocate governance authority among states by guiding domestic 
courts when they are required to decide whether to assert domestic governance authority or defer 
to a foreign state’s governance authority over transnational activity. Thus, conflict-of-laws 
scholars increasingly view conflict of laws as a distinctive approach to global governance 
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(Whytock, 2009b, 2016; Knop, Michaels, & Riles, 2012; Muir Watt & Fernández Arroyo, 2014). 
International law tries to transcend national legal systems by creating a single body of 
international legal rules and a system of international courts to adjudicate disputes, and 
harmonization seeks convergence and ultimately uniformity of national laws. Conflict of laws, in 
contrast, accepts the leading role of domestic legal institutions in governing transnational activity 
(unlike international law’s impulse), and it accepts cross-national legal diversity (unlike 
harmonization’s impulse). Instead, conflict of laws responds by providing rules to help nations 
allocate governance authority among themselves (Whytock, 2014). Thus, conflict-of-laws rules 
can be understood as “structural rules” that help “determine the effectiveness of transnational 
regulation” (Dodge, 2002) and as an attempt to mitigate “clashes between sovereigns, each 
attempting to impose its own regulatory scheme in furtherance of its own policies” (Roosevelt, 
1999). 
 
More than two decades ago, Anne-Marie Slaughter pointed out the relevance of conflict of laws 
from the perspective of liberal international relations theory (Slaughter Burley, 1993). IL/IR 
scholarship has, however, neglected this field of law, notwithstanding its importance to 
transnational relations and global governance. L/WP scholarship promises to contribute to 
understanding world politics by shedding light on the legal and political determinants of conflict-
of-laws decisions and the impact of conflict-of-laws rules on transnational activity and economic 
welfare. 
 
Some steps have already been taken in this direction. Whytock (2011) explores these questions 
in the context of the forum non conveniens doctrine. The forum non conveniens doctrine is a 
common law doctrine that gives a court in one state the discretion to defer to the adjudicative 
authority of another state by dismissing the case in favor of that state instead of asserting 
adjudicative authority itself, and it provides a set of legal factors to guide the exercise of this 
discretion. In the U.S. version of the doctrine, for example, the legal factors include the 
citizenship of the plaintiff (if the plaintiff is a foreign citizen, this factor weighs in favor of 
dismissal) and various other factors that relate to the territorial locus of the alleged conduct and 
injury giving rise to the dispute (if the territorial locus is in another state’s territory, these factors 
weigh in favor of dismissal). Analyzing more than 200 forum non conveniens decisions in the 
U.S. federal district courts in transnational cases between 1990 and 2005, Whytock finds that 
dismissal is more likely when the plaintiff is a non-U.S. citizen and when the territorial locus is 
in another state, suggesting that legal factors influence decisions to defer (or not) to other states. 
He also finds that the courts are more likely dismiss when the other state is a liberal democracy, 
suggesting, consistent with liberal international law theory (Slaughter, 1995), that legal relations 
between democracies may be different than between other states. 
 
Whytock (2009b) explores the determinants of another type of conflict-of-laws decision: choice-
of-law decisions. Analyzing a dataset of more than 200 international choice-of-law decisions by 
U.S. federal district courts in transnational disputes between 1990 and 2005, he finds that these 
courts apply non-U.S. law (foreign law) rather than domestic U.S. law in well over 50% of cases, 
suggesting that U.S. courts are frequently willing to defer to the authority of other states to 
prescribe the rules governing transnational activity. Then, taking advantage of variation of 
choice-of-law rules across U.S. states, he finds that these rules are a significant determinant of 
the likelihood that foreign law will be applied. He also finds that territorial connections between 
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a transnational dispute and a foreign state increase the likelihood that a U.S. court will apply that 
state’s law rather than domestic law, suggesting that territorial connections influence these 
decisions, and he finds evidence that conservative judges are somewhat less likely to apply 
domestic law, perhaps to deter efforts of transnational litigants to “forum shop” into 
U.S. courts in search of supposedly more favorable U.S. law. 
  
Even if these studies shed preliminary light on the legal and political determinants of conflict-of-
laws decisionmaking by domestic courts, they are limited by their focus on U.S. courts and on 
certain types of conflict-of-laws decisions. Next steps include comparative research and research 
on other types of conflict-of-laws decisions, including the recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judgments. Moreover, legal scholars and law- and-economics scholars have developed 
theories about the impact of conflict-of-laws rules and decisions on the ability of states to 
achieve transnational regulatory objectives (Trachtman, 1994; Wai, 2002), on bargaining and 
forum shopping by transnational actors (Whytock, 2009b), and on global economic welfare 
(Parisi & Ribstein, 1998; O’Hara & Ribstein, 1999; Whincop & Keys, 2001; Guzman, 2002; 
Muir Watt, 2003; Carbonara & Parisi, 2009). Empirical research on the consequences of conflict-
of-laws rules and decisions is needed to evaluate these theories—and could create a fruitful 
avenue for collaboration between conflict of laws scholars in law and global political economy 
scholars in political science. 
 
4.3 Private International Law 
 
Private international law consists of rules that govern private transnational activity, such as 
cross-border commercial transactions and family relationships (as noted above, outside the 
United States, conflict of laws is often considered to be part of private international law). A brief 
look at the projects of The Hague Conference on Private International Law and UNCITRAL (the 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law) provides a sense of the wide range of 
transnational problems governed by private international law, ranging from child abduction, 
adoption, and access, to justice, to contracts, corporate securities, electronic commerce, 
insolvency, and arbitration. 
 
Some private international law takes the form of treaties, and to that extent, it is properly 
understood as international law. Private international law treaties include the United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG), which provides rules 
governing contracts for the cross-border sales of goods between private businesses, including 
rules of contract formation, the obligations of buyers and sellers, and remedies for breach of 
contract, and the International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law relating to 
Bills of Lading (“Hague Rules”), which governs the carriage of goods by sea, and specifies the 
rights and obligations of shippers and carriers. However, the use of the term “international law” 
in “private international law” can be misleading, because large portions of private international 
law take the form of domestic law, some of it based on “model” laws developed transnationally. 
Transnational model laws are negotiated by states or drafted by international organizations (often 
with the involvement of private actors), not for adoption as treaties but as templates for domestic 
legislation. For these reasons, private international law may be more fruitfully understood as a 
form of transnational legal ordering, using the framework developed by Halliday and Shaffer 
(2015; see also Shaffer, 2016). 




More than two decades ago, Martin Shapiro (1993) and Anne-Marie Slaughter (Slaughter 
Burley, 1993) called on political scientists to pay more attention to private international law, 
arguing that this area of  legal doctrine was highly relevant to the study of the global political 
economy. Yet IL/IR scholars generally have not heeded this call.  
 
A distinctive feature of the L/WP stage of interdisciplinary scholarship is the growing amount of 
research on the development and consequences of private international law. For example, Cutler 
(2003) examines various aspects of private international law and its role in the global economy, 
including global commercial law unification projects and the modern law merchant. A volume 
edited by Cutler and Dietz (2017) examines the politics of private transnational governance by 
contract. Contributors focus on this form of governance and its relationship to private 
international law and transnational contract law in contexts including global value chains, private 
military companies, and the global cotton trade. 
 
Some scholars are focusing specifically on UNCITRAL, which is one of the leading bodies for 
the development of private international law. UNCITRAL’s aim is to modernize and harmonize 
the rules governing transnational business. Among other things, it produces model laws and 
international conventions on the transnational sale of goods, security interests, insolvency, 
international payments, transport of goods, electronic commerce, procurement and infrastructure 
development, and online dispute resolution. As Cohen (2011) argues, UNCITRAL is an 
important site where legal norms, principles, and standards for the global political economy are 
articulated. Cohen (2008) argues that private international law rules “create the essential legal 
framework through which markets and corporations are constructed, and within (and around) 
which they operate in international transactions” and that “[t]he increasing impact of private 
international law in shaping relationships between states, markets and citizens requires closer 
attention.” He empirically traces global efforts to harmonize the law of secured credit, and finds 
that the leading role was played by a “transnational harmonization coalition” in which “a set 
of powerful political and economic actors [concluded] that secured transaction law 
harmonization could advance their agendas for the reconstruction of the role of states in the 
global economy” (Cohen, 2008). The impact of model laws depends on states adopting them, 
raising questions about the legal and political determinants of state adoption. Efrat (2016) 
conducts a cross-national analysis of state adoption of model commercial laws produced by 
UNCITRAL in the fields of electronic commerce, cross-border insolvency, and transnational 
commercial arbitration, finding that common law countries are more likely to adopt them than 
civil law countries. 
 
Another international organization that plays an important role in the development of private 
international law is The Hague Conference on Private International Law noted above. Efrat and 
Newman (2016) examine the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child 
Abduction, which requires a state where an abducted child is found to secure the return of the 
child to the child’s state of origin without resolving the custody dispute under its own law and in 
its own courts, but instead deferring to the authority of the state of origin to resolve the dispute 
under its law and in its courts. Using event-history analysis of the decisions of existing parties to 
the convention to defer to  new members by accepting their accession to the convention, they 
find that the bigger  the gap between the accepting state’s rule of law and the acceding state’s 
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rule of law, and the greater the gap in women’s parliamentary membership between the two 
states, the lower the likelihood of acceptance. Their findings suggest that deference in private 
international law arrangements depends significantly on the parties’ perceptions of each other’s 
procedural and substantive fairness. 
 
Under what circumstances do private international law rule-making initiatives succeed in 
producing private international law treaties and transnational model laws, and what political and 
legal factors determine which states adopt them? And what are the global economic 
consequences of private international law? These are among the questions that could be the focus 
of fruitful theoretical and empirical investigation. 
 
4.4 Transnational Commercial Arbitration 
 
A fourth stream of L/WP scholarship is moving beyond the “IR” in IL/IR: scholarship on 
transnational commercial arbitration (see generally Moses, 2008; Blackaby et al., 2009; Born, 
2009). Transnational commercial arbitration is a method whereby two or more parties agree to 
have a dispute between them resolved by a private arbitrator (or arbitrators) in accordance with 
rules selected by the parties, and to abide by the arbitrators’ decision, which is called an “award.” 
It is a widely used alternative to litigation as a method for transnational dispute resolution. 
 
Although it is a private form of dispute resolution, transnational commercial arbitration depends 
largely on law and domestic courts for its effectiveness (Reisman, 1992; Kerr, 1997). This is 
because transnational commercial arbitration faces two fundamental enforcement problems: 
enforcement of ex ante arbitration agreements and enforcement of arbitral awards. Privately 
imposed reputational sanctions can help mitigate these problems, but they are likely to be 
effective only under certain conditions (such as the existence of a functioning mechanism for 
disseminating information about parties’ behavior and a relatively high likelihood of repeat 
interactions). Domestic courts can support transnational commercial arbitration by ordering 
enforcement of arbitration agreements and arbitral awards, or hinder transnational commercial 
arbitration by declining to provide that support. Empirical evidence indicates that, in fact, private 
parties frequently seek enforcement of arbitration agreements and arbitral awards in domestic 
courts (Whytock, 2010), and there is an entire field of law that governs how domestic courts 
decide these cases (Moses, 2008; Blackaby et al., 2009; Born, 2009). 
 
The relevant law is a mix of treaties, such as the United Nations Convention on the Recognition 
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (known as the New York Convention)—which one 
expert calls “the foundation on which the whole of the edifice of international arbitration rests” 
(Kerr, 1997). The New York Convention establishes a general rule (subject to enumerated 
exceptions) that signatory states shall, through their domestic courts, recognize and enforce 
arbitration agreements and arbitral awards when requested by a party. In addition, individual 
states have enacted domestic laws providing for domestic judicial enforcement of transnational 
commercial arbitration agreements  and arbitral awards, some of which are based on 
UNCITRAL’s Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration. 
 
Formal state support for transnational commercial arbitration has varied cross-nationally and 
over time (Hale, 2015). For example, the number of state parties to the New York Convention 
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increased from nine in 1960, to fifty-five in 1980, to 124 in 2000. As of 2009, the New York 
Convention had entered into force in 144 of the 192 members of the United Nations. Similarly, 
the number of states that have adopted domestic legislation based on the UNCITRAL Model 
Law has increased steadily from one in 1986, to thirty-five in 2000, to a total of sixty-one as of 
2008 (Whytock, 2010). These figures suggest broad and steadily increasing state support for the 
rules favoring enforcement of arbitration agreements and arbitral awards. 
 
L/WP research on transnational commercial arbitration is driven largely by the understanding 
that arbitration is an important and increasingly widespread form  of private global governance 
(Stone Sweet, 2006; Gal-Or, 2008; Whytock, 2010). By offering a mechanism for third-party 
interpretation and enforcement of contracts, it provides a means by which transnational actors 
can enhance the credibility of their commitments to each other. By providing a process for filling 
gaps in contracts, arbitration can mitigate the incomplete contracting problems routinely faced by 
transnational commercial actors. Transnational commercial arbitration can help transnational 
actors manage the costs of conflict in commercial relationships. And, like litigation, arbitration 
involves disputes over the allocation of rights and resources. Thus, arbitral awards are part of the 
answer to one of the central framing questions of political science: “Who gets what?” (Lasswell, 
1936; Caporaso et al., 2008). This interest has led to a growing amount of interdisciplinary 
scholarship. Hale (2015) presents a theoretical and empirical account of institutional variation in 
transnational commercial arbitration. In an edited volume, Mattli and Dietz (2014) collect recent 
interdisciplinary research on the evolution, consequences, and legitimacy of transnational 
commercial arbitration as a system of private global governance. Stone Sweet and Grisel (2017) 
develop and apply a theory of judicialization to explain the evolution of international arbitration 
as a system of governance. 
 
What are the legal and political determinants of judicial enforcement of transnational commercial 
arbitration agreements and arbitral awards? What are the characteristics of disputants, and what 
are the characteristics of arbitral institutions and processes, that determine whether a disputant 
will comply with an arbitration agreement or arbitral award without enforcement? How do 
different types and varying levels of state support for transnational commercial arbitration affect 
its processes, outcomes, effectiveness, and legitimacy as a form of private governance? These are 
among the questions calling for theoretical and empirical investigation by political scientists. 
Understanding the role of law in transnational commercial arbitration promises to shed light not 
only on this particular form of governance but also on private–public interaction in global 
governance more generally (Whytock, 2010). 
 
 
4.5 International Investment Law 
 
L/WP’s move beyond the “IR” in IL/IR is also evident in the growth of interdisciplinary research 
on international investment law (e.g., Simmons, 2014). International investment law is the 
branch of international law that governs the rights of foreign investors in host states and the 
resolution of investor–state disputes (Dolzer & Schreuer, 2012). The sources of international 
investment law include treaties (most prominently, bilateral investment treaties) as well as 
customary international law and general principles. International investment law governs how 
states treat foreign investors and their investments, and to that extent it can be considered public 
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international law. However, it is perhaps more accurately considered to be a hybrid form of 
international law, insofar as it governs relationships between states and private actors, focuses on 
protecting the rights of those private actors, and relies on private arbitrators for dispute 
resolution. This stream of L/WP research has so far focused primarily on three aspects of 
international investment law. First, it has focused on the design and diffusion of bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs) (e.g., Elkins, Guzman, & Simmons, 2006; Allee & Peinhardt, 2010). 
Second, it has evaluated the effect of BITs on foreign investment (e.g., Yackee, 2008; Büthe & 
Milner, 2009). Third, it has examined investor–state arbitration (e.g., Hafner-Burton, Steinert-
Threlkeld, & Victor, 2016; Cohen, 2017; Pelc, 2017; Puig, 2017; Stone Sweet & Grisel, 2017). 
 
5. BEYOND  INTERNATIONAL  LAW EXCEPTIONALISM: THEORIZING 
 ACROSS THE DOMESTIC–INTERNATIONAL DIVIDE 
 
A third trend is underway as well, on that pushes against the view that international law is 
different in kind from domestic law because international politics is different in kind from 
domestic politics. Sometimes this “international law exceptionalism” is explicit, and sometimes 
it is implicit in IL/IR’s tendency to draw primarily on international relations theory and less 
frequently on theories about law developed in the domestic politics and comparative politics 
subfields of political science. In contrast, L/WP scholarship emphasizes the similarities between 
international law and domestic law, and attempts to leverage those similarities to develop a more 
general understanding of the ways that law can influence the behavior of both states and private 
actors. 
 
5.1 Hierarchy and Anarchy 
 
The principal basis for international law exceptionalism is the traditional structural distinction in 
international relations theory between hierarchical domestic politics, with centralized law 
enforcement, and anarchical international politics, in which there is, at best, decentralized 
enforcement. As Morgenthau (1978) puts it, “The decentralized nature of international law is the 
inevitable result of the decentralized structure of international society. Domestic law can be 
imposed by the group that holds the monopoly of organized force; that is, the officials of the 
state. It is an essential characteristic of international society, composed of sovereign states, which 
by definition are the supreme legal authorities within their respective territories, that no such 
central lawgiving and law- enforcing authority can exist there.” Bull (2002) explains that 
“international law . . . differs from municipal law in one central respect: whereas law within the 
modern state is backed up by the authority of a government, including its power to use or 
threaten force, international law is without this kind of prop.” International lawyers have 
embraced this distinction, too. Higgins (1994) argues that “there are important differences arising 
from the fact that domestic law operates in a vertical legal order, and international law in a 
horizontal legal order.” Shaw (2008) explains that “[w]hile the legal structure within all but the 
most primitive societies is hierarchical and authority is vertical, the international system is 
horizontal, consisting of over 190 independent states, all equal in legal theory . . . and 
recognizing no one in authority over them. The law is above individuals in domestic systems, but 
international law only exists as between the states.” As Hoffmann (1961) puts it, “[i]nternational 
law is one of the aspects of international politics which reflect most sharply the essential 
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differences between domestic and world affairs. . . . International law . . . remains a 
crystallization of all that keeps world politics sui generis.” 
 
The classic realist claim is that the anarchic structure of international relations means that one 
should not expect an important degree of effective international cooperation or international law. 
Much of the last decades’ international relations scholarship has been aimed at responding to this 
claim by showing how there can be effective international cooperation even in the structurally 
anarchic environment of international relations (Keohane, 1984). Others have challenged the 
hierarchy/anarchy distinction altogether, instead proposing a continuum between hierarchy and 
anarchy (Milner, 1991, 1998) or a regime continuum (Stone, 1994). Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 
(2004) “deny any inherent, theoretically significant, distinction between how international and 
domestic regimes operate. Put simply, the range of variation is as great within categories of 
domestic and international as between these categories. . . .” Sandholtz and Whytock (2017a) 
argue that “the intuitive distinction between domestic and international politico-legal systems 
breaks down under scrutiny.” 
 
5.2 A Category Mistake 
 
There is, however, another critique of the hierarchy/anarchy distinction as it is applied to 
international law. The basic point is that it is based on a category mistake: the  comparison is 
made, incorrectly, between international law governing states (international public law) and 
domestic law governing individuals (for example, domestic criminal law). A more apt 
comparison would be between international law governing states (international public law) and 
domestic law governing states (domestic public law), which includes much of domestic 
constitutional law (Fisher, 1961, 1981; Fried, 1968; Whytock, 2004). For example, domestic 
public law governs separation of powers among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches 
of government; it limits state power vis-à-vis individuals by specifying individual rights; and in 
federal systems, it limits federal power vis-à-vis the state’s constituent subunits (such as cantons, 
provinces, or states). Yet there is no higher domestic governmental authority that sits above the 
state, or above the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, able to enforce domestic public 
law against the state. In this sense, international public law and domestic public law are 
similar—they both operate outside the structurally hierarchical setting imagined by international 
relations and international law scholars who use the hierarchy/anarchy distinction to treat 
international law as different in kind from domestic law (Whytock, 2004). 
 
5.3 A Unified Concept of Public Law 
 
For these reasons, a unified concept of public law may be more fruitful for political scientists, 
one that defines public law as law that prescribes appropriate state behavior (Whytock, 2004). 
The concept thus includes those areas of both international law and domestic law (perhaps most 
importantly, domestic constitutional law) that govern states as subjects. Whytock argues that 
there are three advantages to the unified concept. First, he shows that when applied across the 
political science subfields of international relations, domestic politics, and comparative politics, 
the concept reveals a high degree of theoretical convergence across these subfields: on both sides 
of the domestic- international divide, scholars have identified similar causal mechanisms 
whereby law can influence state behavior. This suggests that the theoretical foundations for 
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political science research on public law are therefore already largely in place. Second, by 
rejecting the claim that there is a difference in kind between domestic public law and 
international public law, the unified concept of public law opens the door for potentially fruitful 
research on differences in degree across different settings of public law, not only across domestic 
and international settings but also across time or cross-nationally across different domestic 
political settings and different regional or international political settings. Third, the unified 
concept of public law reveals a basic function shared by both domestic public law and 
international public law. In both domestic and international politics, institutions have power that 
allows them to provide public goods, but they may also abuse that power, thus raising the 
perennial question: who guards the guardians (Keohane, 2001)? Public law is one tool, as 
imperfect as it is pervasive in both domestic and international politics, that attempts to mitigate 
this fundamental problem of governance. 
 
Goldsmith and Levinson (2009) argue that there are additional fundamental similarities between 
domestic public law and international public law. Both types of law have made progress toward 
reducing legal uncertainty, but not as much progress as has been made in domestic law 
governing private individuals, and they are plagued by similar normative problems. On these 
grounds, they agree that there are “constructive implications of assimilating international and 
constitutional law into a more unified vision of public law” (Goldsmith & Levinson, 2009). 
Some scholars go even further, taking a unified approach to not only public law, but to law (or 
norms) in general (Young, 1979; Kratochwil, 1989). Scholars are also thinking beyond the 
domestic–international divide in studying judicialization. Stone Sweet (1999) uses the concept of 
the triad, which he defines as “two contracting parties and a dispute resolver,” and applies it to 
an international case (the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) and a domestic case (the 
French Fifth Republic) to test his theory of the emergence of the triad as a mode of governance. 
Reviewing recent work on domestic courts and international courts, Staton and Moore (2011) 
argue that a unified approach that relaxes the hierarchy/anarchy distinction will allow scholars to 
learn more about judicial power in domestic and international politics, an approach endorsed and 
further developed by Roisman (2015). In a similar spirit, Hathaway and Shapiro (2011) develop 
a theory of “outcasting” as a method of enforcement that applies to both domestic law and 
international law. 
 
More generally, Sandholtz and Whytock (2017a) propose a framework for analyzing the 
relationship between law and politics that focuses on “governance systems” as a unit of analysis. 
They posit that in any given governance system this relationship may vary across the stages of 
the governance process (which include rule making, interpretation, decisionmaking, 
implementation, and legal change). They argue that a promising path toward theory building 
about the relationship between law and politics is comparative analysis of this relationship across 
governance systems and across different stages of governance, without regarding to the 
domestic/international distinction. Contributors to Sandholtz and Whytock (2017b) apply this 
framework to analyze the relationship between law and politics in governance systems in fields 










This article has highlighted three qualities that distinguish the Law and World Politics (L/ WP) 
stage of interdisciplinary scholarship from the earlier International Law and International 
Relations (IL/IR) stage. Moving beyond the “IL” in IL/IR scholarship, political scientists are 
studying domestic law, domestic courts, and other domestic legal institutions, not only their 
foundational role in supporting international law and international courts but also their direct role 
in international relations, including international conflict and foreign policy. Moving beyond the 
“IR” in IL/IR scholarship, political scientists are bringing their research on law up to speed with 
the broader world politics trend in political science by studying the types of law—including 
extraterritoriality, conflict of laws, private international law, transnational commercial 
arbitration, and international investment law—that affect transnational activity of private actors. 
And moving beyond the domestic-international divide, political scientists are increasingly 
rejecting international law exceptionalism, and beginning to take advantage of theoretical 
convergence across the domestic, comparative, and international relations subfields to improve 
understanding of the relationship between law and politics generally. 
 
L/WP scholarship promises to open up new opportunities for collaboration across the fields of 
law and political science. Interdisciplinary collaboration in IL/IR scholarship has primarily 
involved public international scholars and international relations scholars. But L/WP implies the 
involvement of scholars of domestic and comparative politics, including judicial decisionmaking 
scholars in both subfields, given the growing attention being paid to domestic legal institutions 
such as domestic courts and legislatures in the study of world politics. 
 
As I have tried to demonstrate throughout this article, on the legal side of interdisciplinary 
collaboration are fields of law which may be less familiar to international relations scholars than 
public international law, but which are equally if not more important to understand for scholars 
interested in world politics. For this reason, applying legal knowledge to inquiries about world 
politics, rather than simply applying international relations theory and methods to legal 
phenomena—“reversing field,” as Dunoff and Pollack (2014) call it—will be especially 
important in L/WP scholarship. And it will go beyond applying knowledge of public 
international law. For example, there is great potential for fruitful collaboration between political 
scientists interested in world politics and legal scholars in the fields of foreign relations law (e.g., 
Ramsey, 2007; Bradley & Goldsmith, 2008; Sloss, Ramsey, & Dodge, 2011; Franck, Glennon, 
Murphy, & Swaine, 2012; McLachlan, 2014), conflict of laws (e.g., Michaels, 2008; Hay, 
Borchers, & Symeonides, 2010; Weintraub, 2010; Felix & Whitten, 2011; Richman, Reynolds, 
& Whytock, 2013; Briggs, 2014; Roosevelt, 2015; Coyle 2017; Cuniberti, 2017), transnational 
commercial arbitration (e.g., Blackaby, Partasides, Redfern, & Hunter, 2009; Born, 2009; Coe, 
Bermann, Drahozal, & Rogers, 2008), and international investment law and investor-state 
arbitration (e.g., Dolzer & Schreuer, 2012; Douglas, Pauwelyn, & Viñuales, 2014; Puig, 2014; 
Franck, 2005). 
 
Beyond becoming familiar with these and other types of law and legal institutions, L/WP 
schoalrs would benefit from the insights of two broader streams of interdisciplinary legal 
research. One is global legal pluralism, which focuses on and analyzes diverse and overlapping 
domestic, international and private sources of legal authority to govern transnational activity 
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(Michaels, 2009; Zumbansen, 2010; Berman, 2012). The other is the ambitious transnational 
legal orders (TLOs) research agenda spearheaded by Terence Halliday and Gregory Shaffer. A 
TLO is “a collection of formalized legal norms and associated organizations and actors that 
authoritatively order the understanding and practice of law across national jurisdictions” 
(Shaffer, 2012; Halliday & Shaffer, 2015). TLO scholarship studies how TLOs rise and fall, 
where they compete and cooperate, and how they settle and unsettle. These research agendas 
reach well beyond mainstream political science approaches to law. Still, L/WP scholars can learn 
from global legal pluralism’s and TLO scholarship’s attentiveness to diverse actors and 
communities that influence and are influenced by law, their efforts to understand the complex 
socio-legal processes that exist in a globalized world, and their engagement with disciplines 
outside law and political science (such as anthropology and sociology). 
 
To be sure, many of the possibilities being pursued in L/WP scholarship were raised at the 
beginning of the IL/IR stage of interdisciplinary scholarship. Drawing on liberal international 
relations theory, Anne-Marie Slaughter argued more than two decades ago that comparative 
constitutional law, conflict of laws, and private international law play an important role in world 
politics, and she called on political scientists interested in the relationship between law and world 
politics to become more knowledgeable of these and other less familiar areas of law (Slaughter 
Burley, 1993; Slaughter, 1995). For the most part, IL/IR scholarship has not heeded that call, 
even though her work played a central role in launching the IL/IR movement. One way that 
L/WP scholarship distinguishes itself from the earlier stages of interdisciplinary research is by 
taking these areas of law as seriously as IL/IR scholarship has taken public international law. 
 
Some may worry that moving beyond the IL/IR research agenda will result in a loss of focus. But 
L/WP’s move beyond public international law does not require a broadening of the core 
questions of international relations as a discipline. Instead, it simply reflects a growing 
understanding that domestic law, domestic courts, and other domestic legal institutions are an 
important part of answering those core questions and, in some contexts, even more fundamental 
than international law and international courts. 
 
And L/WP’s move beyond international relations merely brings the research agenda up to speed 
with political science’s broader shift from an international relations paradigm toward a world 
politics paradigm. The wager is that with a richer understanding of the diverse types of law and 
legal institutions that are relevant to world politics, political scientists and legal scholars will 
together develop a better understanding of both law and world politics, as well as the complex 
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